A global policy and legal reform paper, with India as the primary case study
Date: October 2026
Abstract
She reports the rape once. Then she reports it again: to the investigating officer, to the medical officer, to the magistrate, to the prosecutor, to the court. She returns to the police station for updates that never arrive. She learns, without being told, that the case will not move unless she moves it. In another district, a family files a murder complaint and then spends years asking whether anyone has been arrested. In a third, a man survives an attempt on his life and discovers that survival has made him the administrator of his own case: twenty-five hearings, twenty-seven months, no verdict.
These are not stories of exceptional cruelty. They are stories of ordinary procedure. In India, rape trials stretch over 5–10 years on average, and even Fast Track Special Courts, established expressly to accelerate them, average 1,639 days in Delhi. The national conviction rate for rape was 24.4% of completed trials in 2024, while nearly 90% of the 2.06 lakh rape cases in the trial pool remained pending at year-end. For murder, 2,72,198 cases were in the trial pool in 2023, with a reported conviction rate of 37.7%. For kidnapping and abduction, the conviction rate was 20.2%. For attempt to murder, a Mumbai study of 196 cases found 32 convictions, an average of 27.4 months from FIR to decision, and 25.8 separate hearings per case. Dacoity cases in the same study took an average of 43.6 months and produced five convictions out of 35 cases.
The pattern is not confined to offences against the person. Robbery, arson, and grievous hurt cases also expose the consequences of prolonged proceedings, although their conviction rates and trial durations vary by offence, jurisdiction, and reporting period. Human trafficking prosecutions face additional procedural challenges despite dedicated legislation and specialised institutional mechanisms. For acid attack survivors, delays in justice can compound the burdens of medical treatment, rehabilitation, and social reintegration. In each case, the offence differs; the underlying procedural problem may remain the same. Victims, bereaved families, survivors, and witnesses are often left to navigate a system whose delays and administrative demands can prolong the consequences of the original crime.
The central problem is not simply that individual cases fail. It is that the system can leave those already harmed carrying an excessive administrative burden in pursuit of a timely verdict. The state bears the legal responsibility to investigate and prosecute offences. Yet victims and their families may find themselves repeatedly seeking updates, tracking proceedings, coordinating with authorities, and attempting to prevent their cases from disappearing into institutional delay. The practical burden of securing progress can thus fall on the very people the justice system is meant to protect.
This paper argues that the allocation of this burden is, in significant part, a matter of institutional design, and that it can be redesigned. It proposes a Single-Contact, State-Managed Criminal Justice Model, in which reporting a crime activates a coordinated, state-managed process rather than imposing a prolonged obligation of individual follow-up on the victim. The objective is not to eliminate victims' participation in justice, but to ensure that participation is meaningful, informed, and dignified rather than administratively exhausting. The fundamental question is not whether victims should participate in justice. It is why they should be made to administer it.
Keywords: victim-centred justice; criminal procedure; secondary victimisation; single-contact reporting; digital justice; procedural burden; victims’ rights; institutional accountability; India; comparative criminal justice.
1. Introduction: The Global Problem, the Indian Laboratory
A person who has suffered a serious crime should not have to spend years pursuing the institutions responsible for investigating that crime. Yet this is the lived experience of victims across legal systems. In England and Wales, the Victims’ Code promises timely information and support, but compliance is uneven. In the European Union, Directive 2012/29/EU requires interviews to be kept to a minimum, yet victims still navigate fragmented national procedures. In the United States, federal victims’ rights are enforceable in principle, but access to counsel and information varies enormously in practice. And in India, the world’s largest democracy, with over 54 million pending cases and more than two-thirds of its prison population comprising undertrials, the gap between statutory promise and procedural reality is especially stark.
India is not an outlier in having a victim burden problem. It is an amplifier: the scale of its caseload, the diversity of its legal cultures across states, and the ambition of its 2023 criminal law reforms make it the most consequential place to test whether a victim-centred model can actually work at population scale.
The central argument is:
Reporting a crime should ordinarily activate a state-managed process, not create a continuing administrative burden that the victim must personally supervise.
This paper is a doctrinal and comparative policy-design analysis. It does not claim that the full SCSM exists anywhere. Its purpose is to propose a coherent reform framework, demonstrate that its components already exist in fragments across jurisdictions, and specify how it could be implemented and evaluated, with India as the primary implementation case.
2. The Anatomy of Procedural Burden
2.1 Secondary Victimisation Is Institutional, Not Incidental
Secondary victimisation, the “second assault”, describes harm caused not by the offender but by the institutions meant to vindicate the victim. It takes predictable forms: insensitive questioning, repeated retelling of traumatic events, invasive medical examinations, delays, disbelief, and rigid procedures that strip survivors of dignity and control. Unlike primary victimisation, it is systemic: it arises from repeated institutional failures, not from individual malice.
In India, public attention to secondary victimisation intensified after the 2012 Delhi gang rape and murder, leading to the Justice Verma Committee reforms, the 2013 and 2018 amendments, and ultimately the replacement of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with the BNSS 2023. The BNSS was marketed as a victim-centric overhaul. Whether it is one is the question to which this paper returns.
2.2 The Transfer of Institutional Responsibility to Victims
In principle, police investigate, prosecutors prosecute, and courts adjudicate. In practice, victims perform functions that belong to institutions: monitoring progress, requesting action, ensuring documents reach authorities, and pursuing compensation. The Indian Supreme Court’s 2025 intervention is illustrative. A bench of Justices Nagarathna and Mahadevan found that compensation remains unpaid primarily because trial courts fail to issue directions, “which results in the burden shifting onto the victim to apply separately before legal services authorities”. The Court lamented that survivors are “often left to run around to secure compensation that the law already entitles them to”.
This is the procedural burden problem in its purest form: the state has the legal obligation, but the victim bears the administrative cost of enforcing it.
2.3 Unequal Burdens, Unequal Justice
Procedural burdens are regressive. A wealthy victim can retain counsel and absorb travel costs; a low-income victim cannot. A disabled victim faces physical barriers; a rural victim faces distance. In India, compensation disparities across states reveal a lack of standardisation, “leaving victims unequally treated depending on geography”. A system that makes access depend on the victim’s resources produces unequal practical access to a formally equal right.
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3. What Existing Frameworks Do, and Do Not, Establish
The SCSM does not begin from zero. It integrates principles already present in international and national law. But it is essential to be precise about what these instruments actually guarantee.
Instrument | Key provision(s) | What it supports | What it does not establish |
|---|---|---|---|
UN Declaration 1985 | Dignity, access, assistance, information, privacy, minimising inconvenience | Broad international principles of victim-centred treatment | A directly enforceable right to one-time reporting and no further attendance |
EU Directive 2012/29/EU | Article 20: minimum interviews, only when strictly necessary; protection and information rights | Minimisation of repeated interviews without prejudice to defence rights | Complete exemption from interviews, hearings, or attendance |
US Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 | Protection, notice, conferral, proceedings free from unreasonable delay | Victims as rights-holders with enforceable procedural entitlements | A general right to avoid all court attendance |
UK Victims’ Code | Information, support, referral to services | A service-standard model for victim treatment | Statutory single-contact coordination or digital case management |
India BNSS 2023 | Section 173 (e-FIR); Section 176 (recording at victim’s place); Section 183(6) (Magistrate-recorded statement as examination-in-chief for disabled victims); Section 193(3)(ii) (90-day progress update, electronic communication permitted); Section 230 (free case papers, but conditional on representation); Section 360 (victim heard on withdrawal) | Significant victim-facing procedural innovations; electronic communication as an accepted channel; some reduction of repeated narration | Continuous case coordination; meaningful periodic updates; unconditional access to case papers; exemption from legally required testimony |
The comparative conclusion is fourfold. First, victim dignity is a recognised legal concern across all surveyed frameworks. Second, repeated interviews and unnecessary burdens can be reduced without abandoning investigation, the EU Directive proves this explicitly. Third, digital communication is already legally recognised, including in India. Fourth, no surveyed framework guarantees that a victim can file once and thereafter avoid all further involvement. The SCSM is an integration and extension, not a restatement of existing universal law.
4. India as the Critical Case: Ambition and Implementation Gap
India is the most instructive jurisdiction for testing the SCSM because its recent reforms are genuinely ambitious, its implementation challenges are documented, and its scale makes success or failure consequential beyond its borders.
4.1 The BNSS’s Victim-Facing Innovations
The BNSS contains several provisions that move toward the SCSM’s logic. Section 173 permits information relating to a cognizable offence to be given by electronic communication, with the FIR taken on record upon signature within three days. Section 176 addresses recording a rape victim’s statement at her residence or place of choice, as far as practicable by a woman police officer, and permits audio-video electronic means. Section 183(6) allows a Magistrate-recorded statement of a victim with a qualifying disability to operate as examination-in-chief, so that the victim can be cross-examined without repeating the entire account at trial, a genuine reduction of secondary victimisation. Section 193(3)(ii) requires police to inform the victim of investigation progress within 90 days, including electronically. Section 360’s final proviso requires the victim to be heard before withdrawal from prosecution.
These are real advances. But they are fragments of a system, not a system.
4.2 The Implementation Gap: Four Documented Failures
First, information is under-specified. Section 193 requires an update “within ninety days,” but does not define “progress,” does not require continuing communication at meaningful milestones, and does not state whether the update must include arrest or non-arrest, forensic submissions, filing of the final report, a proposed closure, or reasons for delay. Nor does it identify a remedy for silence. A single update at day 90 satisfies the letter of the provision while leaving the victim without meaningful oversight for the remainder of the investigation.
Second, access to case papers is circular. Section 230 requires the Magistrate to furnish free copies of the police report, FIR, witness statements, and relevant documents to the accused and to the victim if represented by an advocate. But a victim may need the documents to obtain effective legal advice; conditioning disclosure on representation creates a circular inequality that disadvantages precisely those who cannot afford counsel.
Third, compensation is procedurally burdened. Despite Section 357A of the CrPC, now Section 396 BNSS, and the POCSO Act’s compensation mandate, the Supreme Court found that compensation is “rarely ordered unless victims pursue separate and lengthy proceedings”. In Telangana, only 58 rape survivors received compensation over five years, at an average of ₹3.95 lakh against a maximum eligibility of ₹10 lakh; in 2019-20, only one survivor received compensation. District Legal Services Authorities report that applications stall due to documentation issues and procedural delays, and that public notifications do not show recent updates on fund releases since 2018.
Fourth, support infrastructure exists but is not integrated into the legal process. The Nirbhaya Fund has financed 802 One Stop Centres across 36 States/UTs, assisting over 1.08 million women, alongside a 24x7 Women’s Helpline (181) that has fielded over 21 million calls. These are substantial achievements. But OSCs are support infrastructure, not case-management infrastructure. They do not coordinate police, prosecution, and court communication; they do not track procedural milestones; they do not substitute for a designated case coordinator with authority to escalate delay. The survivor may receive counselling at an OSC and still spend years pursuing the investigation elsewhere.
4.3 Why India Matters Globally
India’s reforms are not uniquely flawed; they are uniquely legible. The BNSS explicitly commits to victim-centricity, electronic communication, and reduced repetition. The implementation gap between those commitments and lived experience is therefore documented with unusual clarity: Supreme Court judgments naming the burden shift, state-level compensation data, and peer-reviewed studies of secondary victimisation. What India reveals is not Indian exceptionalism but a general truth: statutory victim-centrism without procedural architecture produces symbolic rights, not reduced burdens. That lesson is transferable to any jurisdiction that has enacted victim rights without redesigning the machinery that delivers them.
5. The Proposed Model: Single-Contact, State-Managed Criminal Justice
The SCSM rests on a distinction between the victim’s obligation to report information, the state’s obligation to investigate and prosecute according to law, and the victim’s continuing right to participate when necessary or desired.
5.1 Single-Contact Reporting
A victim should be able to initiate the process through one legally recognised reporting channel: a police station, emergency telephone service, secure online portal, authorised reporting centre, or other lawful channel. The victim should receive a unique case identification number, confirmation of registration where legally applicable, the name or identifier of the responsible authority, and information explaining next steps and available support.
Single-contact reporting does not prohibit clarification. If material facts are missing or new evidence emerges, authorities may request further information. Requests should be coordinated, justified, and designed to avoid needless repetition. The system must not use a digital interface to unlawfully refuse complaints or obscure remedies when registration is refused.
5.2 State-Assumed Responsibility
Once a report is received, responsibility for investigating should remain with competent public authorities. The victim should not be expected to coordinate police, forensic laboratories, prosecutors, court registries, medical institutions, and other public bodies. The investigating authority should coordinate evidence collection, witness identification, forensic examinations, digital evidence preservation, lawful records requests, and communication with prosecution. Prosecutors should exercise independent legal judgment; courts should retain control over judicial proceedings.
This division is essential. A single-contact model must not merge independent institutions into an unaccountable body or compromise prosecutorial independence or judicial impartiality. Its purpose is to coordinate their interactions from the victim’s perspective while preserving distinct legal functions.
5.3 Designated Case Coordinator
Each serious criminal case should have an identified point of contact responsible for procedural communication, a trained victim-support officer or case coordinator, not necessarily the investigating officer. The coordinator should:
→ Provide the case reference and contact information.
→ Explain procedural stages in accessible language.
→ Communicate verified updates and significant changes.
→ Coordinate appointments and requests for additional information.
→ Inform the victim of hearings and remedies.
→ Refer protection concerns to competent authorities.
→ Escalate missed deadlines and unresolved administrative problems.
The coordinator must not determine guilt, direct judicial decisions, or interfere with investigators and prosecutors. The role is administrative and supportive, with defined accountability. In the Indian context, this function could be housed within a strengthened One Stop Centre framework or a dedicated victim-case unit attached to the District Legal Services Authority, with a statutory duty to escalate to the Magistrate where milestones are missed.
5.4 Digital-First, Not Digital-Only
Routine communication should occur through secure digital channels or telephone where legally appropriate and acceptable to the victim. A secure case portal could provide case status, responsible authority, upcoming appointments, outstanding requests and reasons, decisions communicated to the victim, and contact details for support and complaints. Access must be controlled through authentication, role-based permissions, audit logs, data minimisation, and retention policies. Sensitive information, particularly in sexual-offence cases, must not be exposed through insecure messages or broadly accessible databases.
Digital-first must not mean digital-only. Telephone, accessible in-person assistance, interpreters, and other alternatives must remain available. India’s OSC and 181 helpline infrastructure provides a ready offline and telephone backbone that a digital portal could complement rather than replace.
5.5 Minimal Repeated Interviews
A victim should not be required to repeat the same account to different officials merely because institutions do not share records. Where legally permissible, an initial detailed interview should be securely recorded and made available to authorised personnel. Further interviews should occur only when they serve a necessary investigative or judicial function.
The BNSS already gestures toward this logic in Section 183(6) for disabled victims. The SCSM would generalise the principle: recorded statements should be the default where evidence law permits, with supplementary questioning justified and documented. For sexual violence, child victims, victims with disabilities, and people with specific protection needs, procedures should be tailored to minimise distress. The system must distinguish avoidable repetition from legitimate supplementary questioning; new witnesses, forensic findings, inconsistencies requiring clarification, or defence issues may justify additional questioning. Recorded statements must comply with evidence law, procedural safeguards, privacy protections, and the accused’s right to challenge evidence.
5.6 No Unnecessary Physical Attendance
Victims should not be required to attend police stations or courts merely to obtain routine updates, submit documents that can lawfully be submitted electronically, or perform administrative tasks public officials can complete themselves. Where participation is necessary, authorities should consider remote interviews, video links, recorded testimony where legally admissible, accessible facilities, travel assistance, and other accommodations.
Whether testimony can be recorded in advance or given remotely remains subject to governing law and the court’s assessment of fairness, evidentiary reliability, and the accused’s rights. A material witness may still need to testify and undergo cross-examination. The reform requires authorities to distinguish attendance necessary to establish truth from attendance caused by procedural habit or administrative failure.
5.7 State-Managed Prosecution and Compensation
The victim should not have to personally finance or coordinate the state’s investigation and prosecution as a condition of receiving criminal justice. Where victims have legal rights to private participation, representation, review, or appeal, those rights should be preserved. Legal aid should be available to eligible victims. If a victim becomes unavailable, withdraws cooperation, or dies, authorities should assess whether the case can lawfully proceed on available evidence. Prosecution should not automatically collapse because the victim cannot manage the process; equally, the state must not manufacture evidence.
Critically, compensation should be initiated by the court or prosecution at the point of judgment or earlier, not left to the victim to pursue separately. The Indian Supreme Court’s 2025 direction, that trial courts must issue compensation directions at judgment, and that judicial academies must train judges accordingly, is a partial move in this direction. The SCSM would make this automatic and system-triggered rather than dependent on judicial awareness.
6. Limits and Safeguards
A complaint is not proof of guilt. Authorities must investigate impartially, assess exculpatory and inculpatory evidence, and comply with legal standards. The accused retains the presumption of innocence and fair-trial rights.
Some further participation is indispensable. A victim may be the only person who can identify the perpetrator, describe an event, explain a threat, or establish a material fact. The model creates a presumption against unnecessary repetition, not an absolute right to refuse all further interviews or testimony.
Victim autonomy must be preserved. Victims should receive information about relevant decisions and retain rights to be heard, seek legal advice, request protection, pursue compensation, or challenge specified decisions. Some victims may wish to attend court or communicate with prosecutors; their choice should be respected.
Confidentiality and security are non-negotiable. Digital case management creates risks if personal information, addresses, medical records, witness identities, or evidence are improperly accessed. The system requires access controls, secure authentication, audit logs, data minimisation, retention policies, and sanctions for unauthorised disclosure.
7. Institutional Accountability: Making the Model Enforceable
A digital portal alone will not solve the problem. The proposal requires enforceable duties, clear ownership, and consequences for avoidable failures.
Duty | Standard | Evidence | Remedy |
|---|---|---|---|
Registration and case reference | Within prescribed time | Case management record | Written reasons; independent review |
Designated contact | For serious offences | Coordinator assignment record | Escalation to supervisor |
Victim updates | At prescribed intervals and on significant developments | Communication log | Complaint; performance reporting |
Additional interviews | Only with documented legitimate purpose | Interview justification record | Review; disciplinary referral if improper |
Attendance requests | Only when legally necessary | Attendance justification | Remote alternative; complaint |
Compensation initiation | At judgment or earlier, automatically | Court order record | Appellate review; training |
Delay escalation | Automatic flag and review | Milestone audit trail | Corrective direction; public reporting |
Privacy breach | Immediate containment and notification where lawful | Security incident log | Sanction; corrective action |
7.1 Automatic Escalation of Delays
Each case should have recorded procedural milestones and the authority responsible for each stage. When a deadline is missed, the system should automatically flag the delay for review. A supervisor or designated oversight body should examine the reason and direct corrective action within its legal authority. An automated alert should not itself determine misconduct; delays may arise from legitimate evidentiary, forensic, security, or judicial considerations. Accountability requires recorded reasons and proportionate review, not automatic punishment.
7.2 Independent Complaint and Review
Victims should have a simple way to complain about refusal to register or improper classification; failure to communicate required information; unjustified repeated interviews or attendance demands; negligent delay; privacy breaches; and failures to address safety concerns. Complaints should be reviewable by an authority independent of the official whose conduct is challenged. The review mechanism should be capable of ordering lawful corrective action and referring possible misconduct for disciplinary or legal proceedings.
7.3 Recorded Reasons and Public Reporting
Where law permits an authority to decline an investigative step, discontinue a line of enquiry, or take another decision materially affecting the victim’s interests, reasons should be recorded and communicated to the extent legally permissible. Confidentiality, witness safety, and investigative integrity may justify withholding particular information, but such restrictions should have a lawful basis rather than becoming a general excuse for non-communication.
Governments should publish anonymised statistics on time between reporting and registration, time to first substantive update, frequency of repeated interviews, avoidable physical visits, compliance with communication deadlines, complaint resolution times, remote participation use, compensation initiation rates, and data-security incidents.
8. Implementation Framework
Phase 1: Legal and Procedural Audit
Map existing reporting, investigation, prosecution, and trial processes for selected serious offences. Identify repeated data collection, unnecessary attendance requirements, fragmented communication, avoidable delays, and points where victims coordinate public institutions. Distinguish statutory requirements from administrative practice. In India, this audit should specifically examine why Section 193’s 90-day update is not producing meaningful periodic communication, and why Section 230’s document access is not reaching unrepresented victims.
Phase 2: Minimum Victim-Service Standards
Legislation or binding procedural rules should specify the right to an accessible reporting channel and case reference; the duty to designate a responsible contact for serious cases; prescribed updates through accessible channels; a presumption against repetitive questioning without legitimate purpose; the duty to consider remote participation and reasonable accommodations; automatic initiation of compensation at judgment; and the right to complain and obtain independent review. In India, BNSS rules under Section 193 should prescribe minimum information content and periodicity, and Section 230 should be amended to provide documents to the victim regardless of representation, with legal aid referral where needed.
Phase 3: Interoperable Case Management
Establish a secure case-management system permitting authorised information sharing between police, prosecution, courts, and victim-support bodies. Interoperability must not mean unrestricted access. Each institution should access only what it is legally authorised and operationally required to see. The system should preserve an audit trail showing when records were accessed, updated, or disclosed. In India, this system should be built on the existing digital public infrastructure model, interoperable, auditable, and accessible through the OSC and 181 networks, rather than as a standalone portal that replicates existing silos.
Phase 4: Training and Victim Support
Train police, prosecutors, court staff, forensic personnel, and coordinators on victim communication, trauma-informed interviewing, privacy, disability accommodation, digital security, and role limits. Integrate victim-support services into the process rather than offering them only after the victim has navigated the system alone. India’s judicial academies should include compensation-ordering and victim-communication modules, as the Supreme Court has already directed.
Phase 5: Pilot, Evaluate, Expand
Begin with selected serious offences and jurisdictions, including urban and rural areas, victims with different accessibility needs, and cases of varying complexity. An independent evaluation should compare outcomes before and after implementation. Expansion should depend on demonstrated improvements, not merely the launch of a digital platform.
9. Evaluation Criteria
Indicator | Proposed measure |
|---|---|
Reporting burden | Number of physical visits required solely for administrative purposes |
Interview repetition | Number of interviews per victim and documented justification |
Communication | Time to first update; compliance with prescribed update schedules |
Case coordination | Proportion of serious cases with identified coordinator |
Institutional delay | Number and duration of overdue milestones, with reasons |
Compensation initiation | Proportion of eligible cases with court-initiated compensation directions at judgment |
Accessibility | Availability of telephone, digital, in-person, interpretation, and disability support |
Victim experience | Surveyed administrative burden, perceived dignity, access to information |
Fair-trial safeguards | Compliance with evidentiary, disclosure, defence, and judicial requirements |
Data protection | Security incidents, unauthorised access, corrective action |
A lower number of interviews is not necessarily better if essential evidence is left unexamined. A shorter investigation is not necessarily better if accuracy is compromised. A high conviction rate should not be treated as the principal measure of success, since criminal justice must also protect against wrongful prosecution and conviction. The purpose is to assess whether the system reduces avoidable burdens while maintaining quality, fairness, and reliability.
10. Anticipated Objections
“The system cannot operate without victims’ cooperation.” Correct in some cases, but this does not justify requiring victims to manage routine administration. The model preserves necessary participation while transferring coordination to responsible authorities.
“Remote proceedings could weaken cross-examination.” Remote testimony may create difficulties. The response is not mandatory remote participation in every case, but permitted use subject to judicial control and procedural safeguards. Comparative evidence from England and Wales’ Special Measures regime suggests that pre-recorded cross-examination can reduce trauma but must be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended effects on trial outcomes.
“A single complaint could encourage incomplete reporting.” The model permits clarification and supplementary evidence. Its objective is to eliminate unnecessary repetition, not freeze the investigation.
“Digital systems are expensive and vulnerable.” Technology requires investment, cybersecurity, maintenance, and training. Implementation should be phased, independently audited, and supported by offline alternatives. India’s existing OSC and helpline infrastructure demonstrates that offline and telephone support can coexist with digital-first design.
“The state may neglect cases even after assuming responsibility.” This is the central risk. The proposal therefore combines state responsibility with automatic escalation, recorded reasons, independent review, public reporting, and remedies. India’s experience with Section 193, a duty to inform that has not produced meaningful periodic communication, demonstrates that a duty without an enforcement mechanism is insufficient. The SCSM’s accountability architecture is designed precisely to close that gap.
11. Limitations and Further Research
This paper is a policy proposal grounded in selected legal frameworks. It is not a systematic review of every country’s criminal procedure and does not establish the comparative frequency of unnecessary attendance or repeated interviews across all jurisdictions.
Further research should examine implementation of victim-rights laws in a broader range of countries, including gaps between statutory entitlements and institutional practice. Empirical research should collect data on the number of times victims attend police stations and courts, the frequency and reasons for repeated interviews, financial and psychological costs, and availability of remote alternatives. Research should also assess whether integrated case-management systems improve communication without increasing privacy risks, whether recorded interviews preserve evidentiary quality, and how digital-first procedures affect rural and disadvantaged populations.
A comparative implementation study could classify reforms into three categories: measures already guaranteed by law, measures permitted but inconsistently implemented, and measures requiring new legislation or institutional infrastructure. India’s BNSS provides a particularly rich case for this classification, because it contains examples of all three.
12. Conclusion
A criminal justice system should not make the victim responsible for ensuring that justice is administered. The state has a responsibility to investigate reported offences, prosecute where evidence and law justify prosecution, protect people from further harm, and provide fair and accessible procedures. Victims have an important role, but their participation should not become an excuse for transferring administrative responsibility from public institutions to the people those institutions are meant to serve.
The global comparative record establishes that victim dignity, information, and protection are recognised legal concerns. The EU Directive proves that repeated interviews can be minimised without abandoning investigation. The US statute establishes victims as rights-holders. India’s BNSS introduces electronic reporting, remote statement recording, and time-linked information obligations. But none of these frameworks establishes the integrated architecture the SCSM proposes: one report, one coordinator, continuous digital communication, documented justification for further participation, automatic escalation of delay, and court-initiated compensation.
India is the most important place to test this model, not because it is the worst performer, but because its reforms are the most explicit, its implementation gaps are the most documented, and its scale makes the consequences of success or failure global. The Supreme Court’s 2025 compensation directions, the One Stop Centre network, and the BNSS’s electronic communication provisions are all building blocks. What is missing is the connective architecture that turns them into a system in which the victim reports once and the state carries the burden thereafter.
The right to justice must not depend on a victim’s ability to repeatedly pursue the institutions responsible for delivering it.
References for the Opening Section
The following references correspond to the empirical claims made in the opening section. Official statistical tables are cited wherever available. For reported studies, judicial observations, and secondary reporting, the relevant publications are identified alongside their source links.
1. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). (2023). Crime in India 2023. Table: “Disposal of IPC Cases by Police & Court.” Data on murder, kidnapping and abduction, hurt (including acid attack), rioting, robbery, and dacoity.
2. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). (2024). Rape trial pendency and conviction data. Reported in The Statesman, 1 September 2026. “Thousands of Rape Cases Reach India’s Courts, but How Many End in Conviction?”
3. Fast Track Special Courts, Delhi. Average rape trial duration of 1,639 days, approximately four and a half years. Reported in India Today, 23 July 2026. “India’s Fast-Track Courts: Fast Hearings, Slow Convictions.”
4. Chintan India Foundation. (2025, 11 August). “Delayed Justice in Rape Cases: Examining Systemic and Legal Barriers.” Discussion of prolonged rape trials, including reported durations of five to ten years.
5. Praja Foundation study of serious criminal cases in Mumbai (2008–2012). Findings concerning 1,326 serious criminal cases, including 196 attempt-to-murder cases and 35 dacoity cases. Reported in Hindustan Times, 28 March 2018. “77% Serious Crime Cases in Mumbai Resulted in Acquittals: Study.”
6. Praja Foundation. Report on State of Policing and Law & Order in Mumbai. Full study report containing the analysis of serious criminal cases and associated procedural timelines.
7. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). Table 18B.1. Statistical data on robbery and dacoity conviction rates and pendency in criminal cases.
8. Kidnapping and abduction cases in India. Report on the number of cases registered in 2023 and related NCRB statistics. NDTV, 30 September 2025. “Over 1 Lakh Kidnapping Cases Reported in 2023.”
9. Human trafficking and criminal justice outcomes. Reporting on Supreme Court Justice N. Kotiswar Singh’s call for stronger anti-trafficking legislation and concerns about low conviction rates, procedural delays, and victim protection. Deccan Chronicle, 1 August 2026. “SC Judge Calls for Stronger Anti-Trafficking Law.”
10. Acid attack cases and prolonged judicial proceedings. Report on Supreme Court concerns regarding pending acid attack cases, including a case pending for more than 16 years. The Bar Bulletin, 4 December 2025. “SC Seeks Status of Pending Acid Attack Cases Across India; Concerned Over Long-Pending Trials.”
11. Acid attack survivors and the need for institutional accountability. The Hindu, 4 December 2025. “Show No Sympathy to Acid Attackers, Entire System Must Respond Against Them: CJI.”
12. Procedural burdens on victims across serious criminal cases. For the broader argument that victims, survivors, witnesses, and bereaved families often bear substantial practical burdens in pursuing justice, consult the Praja Foundation study (References 5–6) and the NCRB criminal case disposal tables (References 1 and 7).
13. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). Prison Statistics India. Data on undertrial prisoners and related indicators of the criminal justice system's institutional burden.
References
The following references are formatted for inclusion in the paper, with clickable links to the cited sources.
1. United Nations General Assembly (1985). Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Resolution 40/34.
→ Read the official document (PDF)
2. European Parliament and Council (2012). Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.
3. United States Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 3771: Crime Victims’ Rights.
4. Government of India (2023). Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Act No. 46 of 2023.
5. Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom. Code of Practice for Victims of Crime in England and Wales (Victims’ Code).
6. Government of India (2023). Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. Act No. 22 of 2023.
7. Singh, H., & Yadav, G. (2026). “Secondary Victimisation of Rape Survivors in India: A Criminological Study of Police and Court Processes.” International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, 9(1), 1405–1420.
8. Kaur, A. (2026). “Secondary Victimization in Sexual Offence Trials: Do the BNSS 2023’s Procedural Safeguards Actually Reduce Courtroom Re-Traumatization? A Comparative Study with England and Wales’ Special Measures Framework.” Zenodo.
→ Read the research paper on Zenodo
9. Shravani (2025). “Victims’ Role in the Criminal Justice System: A Comparative Analysis of India, UK, and US.” International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, 8(3).
10. Deccan Chronicle (24 November 2025). “Rape Survivors Face Roadblocks in Getting Compensation.”
11. Hindustan Times (8 November 2025). “SC Mandates Timely Victim Compensation Orders by Trial Courts.”
→ Read the article via Magzter
12. Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India. Nirbhaya Fund and One Stop Centre (Sakhi Centres) Scheme Documentation.
→ Visit the Ministry's official website
13. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), Government of India. Prison Statistics India.
→ Visit the NCRB official website
Important: These links are formatted as clickable hyperlinks. Their inclusion does not independently verify the accuracy of every publication detail or claim attributed to each source. Before submitting the paper for academic or legal publication, verify the bibliographic details and ensure that each source directly supports the specific claim for which it is cited.
Justice That Deters: How a Victim-Centred Criminal Justice System Can Reduce Crime
The Deterrent Effect of Victim-Centred Justice
A criminal justice system that relieves victims of unnecessary procedural burdens can also strengthen the deterrence of crime. When victims are discouraged from reporting offences by repeated visits, prolonged delays, financial costs, or the expectation that they must continually pursue the authorities, crimes may remain unreported, investigations may lose momentum, and offenders may perceive a lower likelihood of facing legal consequences.
A single-contact, state-managed system could help reverse this dynamic through several mechanisms.
First, it can increase the reporting of crime.
By making reporting accessible and reducing the burden of subsequent participation, the system may encourage more victims to come forward. This can improve the information available to investigators and help identify repeat offenders and patterns of criminal activity.
Second, it can strengthen the certainty of apprehension and prosecution.
When authorities assume responsibility for evidence collection, investigation, case coordination, and procedural follow-up, fewer cases should depend on a victim's ability to persistently pursue officials. If accompanied by adequate investigative capacity and institutional accountability, this may increase the perceived likelihood that offenders will be identified and prosecuted.
Third, it can reduce opportunities for intimidation and obstruction.
Victims who must repeatedly approach police stations or attend proceedings may face additional opportunities for threats, pressure, or retaliation. Secure communication, coordinated appointments, protective measures, and reduced unnecessary exposure can help mitigate these risks and support continued cooperation with lawful investigations.
Fourth, it can improve the use of public resources.
Reducing duplicated interviews, unnecessary attendance, and fragmented administration can allow institutions to devote more time to investigating offences, examining evidence, and pursuing cases. The resulting deterrent effect would depend on whether the resources saved are actually redirected towards effective enforcement.
Fifth, it can strengthen public confidence in the rule of law.
When people see that reporting a crime triggers a competent institutional response, they may become more willing to report offences and cooperate with investigations. Conversely, when offenders perceive that victims can be exhausted into abandoning their pursuit of justice, institutional failure may undermine deterrence.
Conclusion
The deterrent effect of this reform would arise not from making criminal procedure easier for its own sake, but from making the state's response to crime more reliable. Criminological research generally finds that the perceived certainty of being caught and punished has a stronger deterrent effect than simply increasing the severity of punishment. However, the extent to which this particular model would reduce crime must be established empirically; a manifold reduction cannot be assumed in advance.
The objective is to ensure that committing a crime does not become easier because the victim is too exhausted, intimidated, impoverished, or administratively burdened to pursue justice. By making the state responsible for the process and strengthening the likelihood of a timely, lawful response, victim-centred justice can become an important component of a broader crime-deterrence strategy.
Scope note: The SCSM and its recommendations are the author’s policy proposals. They should not be read as existing legal entitlements in any jurisdiction. The comparative discussion identifies selected legal foundations and does not claim that the full model has been implemented or empirically validated. India-specific recommendations require legislative drafting, stakeholder consultation, and constitutional review.
