Mutual Assured Destruction in an Age of Uncertainty: Why Nuclear War Cascades from Bilateral Conflict to Civilizational Collapse
Author: Bharat Luthra
Founder: Civitology
Discipline: Civilizational Longevity Science
Discipline: Civilizational Longevity Science
Executive Summary
The strategic orthodoxy of the late twentieth century was governed by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), a stability ostensibly guaranteed by the rational calculations of two superpowers. However, the geopolitical architecture of the twenty-first century has fundamentally shifted, rendering this bipolar stability obsolete. This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the seminal paper 'Mutual Assured Destruction in an Age of Uncertainty: Why Nuclear War Cascades from Bilateral Conflict to Civilizational Collapse'. It investigates the central thesis that the contemporary nuclear environment is defined by "doomed-state incentives" and "system-clearing escalation," mechanisms that practically ensure any limited nuclear exchange will cascade into a global omnicide.
Our analysis, grounded in an extensive review of strategic literature, game theory, and climate modeling, indicates that the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar nuclear world has introduced new, volatile variables. Specifically, the emergence of "terminal rationality"—where a state, perceiving its own imminent destruction, prioritizes retributive spite over survival—has fundamentally altered the deterrence calculus.1 Furthermore, the incentives for "system-clearing"—the strategic imperative to destroy neutral or rising powers to prevent them from dominating the post-war hierarchy—guarantee that no nation can remain a bystander in a major nuclear conflict.3
This report is structured to systematically dismantle the "nuclear optimism" of the past. It begins by examining the decay of classical deterrence theory in a multipolar context. It then explores the psychological singularity of the "doomed state," analyzing the "Samson Option" and the rationality of revenge. Subsequently, it details the logic of "system-clearing" escalation, where the targeting of neutral powers becomes a rational imperative for dying hegemons. The analysis then turns to the technological accelerants of this cascade, specifically Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automated "Dead Hand" systems, which compress decision times and remove human agency from the escalation ladder. Finally, the report quantifies the mechanisms of civilizational collapse, synthesizing recent data on nuclear winter, global famine, and the fragility of interdependent supply chains to demonstrate why the "No Safe Haven" theory is the only empirically valid conclusion.
1. The Erosion of Stability: From Bipolar Certainty to Multipolar Chaos
The foundation of global nuclear security for decades has been the theory of nuclear deterrence, specifically the stability induced by Mutual Assured Destruction. This section analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of this doctrine and demonstrates how the shift to a multipolar world has eroded its validity, creating a fragile "Age of Uncertainty."
1.1 The Theoretical Decay of Classical MAD
Classical deterrence theory, derived largely from the bipolar standoff of the Cold War, posits that nuclear weapons induce caution. Kenneth Waltz, a leading proponent of "nuclear optimism," famously argued that "more may be better"—that as more states acquire nuclear weapons, they become risk-averse, thereby reducing the likelihood of major war. This logic relies on the assumption of a unitary, rational actor whose primary goal is survival. In a bipolar world (e.g., US vs. USSR), the calculus is relatively linear: State A does not strike State B because State B will destroy State A. The cost (annihilation) outweighs any gain.
However, current scholarship and the paper under review argue that this model is fatally flawed in the current strategic environment. We have moved from a "balance of terror" to a "tipping point" of proliferation.8 The current landscape involves multiple great powers (US, China, Russia) and several regional nuclear states (India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel), creating a "N-body" deterrence problem that is inherently unstable.9
In this multipolar environment, the "fog of war" is denser. The risk is no longer merely a miscalculation between two familiar adversaries, but a "catalytic nuclear war," where a conflict between two secondary powers (or a third-party provocateur) draws in the major powers. Research suggests that "imbalance alone is unstable, but particularly so when costs are low and preemption is attractive".11 In a multipolar world, a strike by State A against State B fundamentally alters the relative power balance for States C and D, creating complex incentives for preemption and third-party intervention that classical MAD does not account for.
1.2 The "Stability-Instability Paradox" in the 21st Century
A critical failure mode of modern deterrence is the "Stability-Instability Paradox." This theory suggests that while nuclear weapons may deter full-scale strategic exchanges, they actually incentivize lower-level conventional conflicts, as belligerents assume the other side will not risk nuclear escalation for a minor skirmish.9
In the "Age of Uncertainty," this paradox is exacerbated by "entanglement"—the intertwining of conventional and nuclear command and control (C3I) systems. As states modernize their militaries, conventional assets (like early warning radars or dual-use satellites) are increasingly integrated with nuclear infrastructure. A conventional strike intended to blind an adversary in a limited war—for example, an attack on a satellite during a Taiwan Strait crisis—could be interpreted as the prelude to a nuclear first strike. This "entanglement" creates a pathway where the stability-instability paradox collapses: a "safe" conventional war inadvertently triggers a nuclear response because the adversary fears their nuclear deterrent is being neutralized.
The analysis indicates that the comfortable assumption of "firebreaks" between conventional and nuclear conflict is a relic of the Cold War. In a multipolar world characterized by entanglement, the ladder of escalation is slippery and non-linear.
Table 1: Evolution of Strategic Stability Paradigms
1.3 The "Chain-Ganging" Effect
Multipolarity introduces the risk of "chain-ganging," where states are dragged into unwarranted wars by reckless allies. In a nuclear context, this is particularly dangerous. If a nuclear-armed junior partner (e.g., North Korea or Pakistan) initiates a conflict, their great power patron may be forced to intervene to preserve the alliance structure or preventing the collapse of a buffer state.
The research highlights that "chain-ganging" is distinct from entanglement. It is driven by the distribution of power and the threat to survival rather than just technical overlap. For instance, the US extended deterrence guarantees in Asia create a dynamic where a local clash involving Japan or the Philippines could rapidly ascend to a US-China strategic exchange. In this environment, the restraint of the superpower is held hostage to the risk appetite of the ally.
2. The Psychology of the Doomed State: Terminal Rationality and Spite
Central to the paper's thesis is the concept of the "doomed state." Classical game theory struggles to model the behavior of an actor that perceives its own destruction as inevitable. When a state's survival—its primary utility function—is negated, its decision-making paradigm shifts from "instrumental rationality" to "terminal rationality."
2.1 Instrumental vs. Terminal Rationality
"Instrumental rationality" is the logic of survival and optimization: taking actions that maximize the probability of continuing to exist and prosper. "Terminal rationality," by contrast, concerns the final goals or values of an agent. In the context of a losing nuclear war, where the state's leadership accepts that the nation "will likely cease to exist as a functioning state" , instrumental rationality breaks down. There is no future to optimize for.
At this singularity, the "terminal" values of the leadership take over. Research suggests that these values often shift toward:
Retributive Justice (Spite): Inflicting maximum cost on the destroyer.
Legacy Preservation: Ensuring the enemy does not write the history books.
Hierarchy Denial: Ensuring no rival power inherits the earth.
The concept of "spite" is frequently dismissed in international relations as irrational. However, evolutionary psychology and game theory indicate that spite—paying a cost to inflict a cost on another—is a credible and persistent human behavior. In a "doomed state" scenario, the cost of retaliation is effectively zero because the state is already dead. Therefore, the execution of maximum retaliation becomes the "rational" move to satisfy the terminal value of justice or vengeance.
2.2 The "Samson Option": Strategic Suicide
The most explicit manifestation of this logic is Israel's "Samson Option." Named after the biblical figure who collapsed the temple to kill himself and his Philistine captors, this strategy envisions a massive nuclear strike if the state is overrun. The strategic rationale is summarized as: "Israel may sometime have to accept mega-destructive attacks, but it surely won't allow itself to 'die with the Philistines' or become the combatant country to suffer more dire consequences".
The Samson Option serves a dual purpose. In peacetime, it creates an ultimate deterrent: an existential threat to the state will result in an existential threat to the aggressor (and potentially the region). In wartime, however, it transforms the state into a "suicide bomber" on a geopolitical scale. The logic dictates that if the state goes down, it takes the region—and perhaps the world—with it. This is not merely about punishing the attacker; it is about "normalizing" the destruction so that the state does not die alone.
2.3 The "Rationality of Irrationality"
Thomas Schelling, a titan of nuclear strategy, proposed the "Rationality of Irrationality" as a bargaining tactic. This concept suggests that it can be rational to pretend to be irrational—to convince an adversary that you are "mad" enough to trigger mutual destruction over a minor issue. If the adversary believes you are a "madman" (like Nixon's "Madman Theory"), they will yield to avoid the catastrophe.
However, the "doomed state" scenario moves beyond feigning irrationality. When a state is actually doomed, the "mad" behavior (total retaliation) becomes genuinely rational from the perspective of terminal values. The leadership, hiding in bunkers and watching their cities burn, faces a "use it or lose it" dilemma with their remaining arsenal. The "broken-backed war" theory suggests that even after the initial exchange, survivors will try to continue fighting. But a "doomed" leadership might decide that a broken-backed struggle is a fate worse than death, and instead opt for a system-clearing finale.
2.4 The Problem of "Spite" in Multipolar Deterrence
In a bilateral world, spite is directed at the destroyer. In a multipolar world, spite can be directed at beneficiaries. If the US is destroyed by Russia, and China survives intact, China becomes the global hegemon. A "spiteful" US leadership, operating under terminal rationality, might view a Chinese-dominated world as an unacceptable outcome of their demise. This leads directly to the targeting of neutral powers, a phenomenon we analyze in the next section as "System-Clearing Escalation."
3. System-Clearing Escalation: Targeting the Post-War Hierarchy
The most chilling argument presented in the paper is the concept of "system-clearing." This theory posits that in a massive nuclear exchange, belligerents have a rational incentive to expand their targeting to include neutral or rising powers. The objective is not military victory—which is impossible—but the leveling of the post-war geopolitical hierarchy.
3.1 The Geopolitical Logic: Relative Gains and Hegemony
Realist theory emphasizes that states care about relative gains. Power is zero-sum. If the United States and Russia mutually annihilate each other, their relative power drops to zero. If China (or the EU, or India) remains untouched, its relative power becomes absolute. The surviving power inherits the earth, shaping the post-war order, dictating the new international laws, and potentially occupying the remnants of the destroyed states.
For a superpower, the prospect of its rival inheriting the world is bad; the prospect of a tertium gaudens (rejoicing third party) inheriting the world is arguably worse. It represents the total failure of the state's historical project. Therefore, "system-clearing" implies that a rational war plan for a superpower must include options to "clear" the board of potential hegemons.
3.2 "China Benefits": The Strategic Anxiety
Strategic discourse frequently highlights the anxiety that "only China benefits from war with Russia" or a US-Russia conflict. This "China-first-and-last" school of thought argues that any conflict that degrades Western or Russian power without touching China is a strategic defeat.
This anxiety manifests in the concept of "system-clearing" targeting. If a US-Russia nuclear war begins, war planners in both Moscow and Washington must consider the post-war balance of power. If they leave China's industrial and military capacity intact, China will inevitably dominate the post-atomic era.
For Russia: A devastated Russia would be vulnerable to Chinese expansion into Siberia and the Far East. To prevent this, Russia might target Chinese industrial centers or military concentrations as part of its general war plan, ensuring that China is also reduced to a "broken-backed" status.
For the United States: The US might fear that a surviving China would impose a hegemonic authoritarian order globally. To "save democracy" (or simply Western dominance) in the long run, the US might feel compelled to strike Chinese capabilities to ensure a level playing field for the surviving Western remnants.
This dynamic is supported by offensive realism, which suggests that cooperation is difficult because states are constantly evaluating relative gains. The "post-war hierarchy" is a prize that the doomed states are incentivized to destroy rather than hand over.4
3.3 Mechanisms of System-Clearing: Beyond Kinetic Strikes
System-clearing does not necessarily require the direct nuclear bombardment of neutral cities, though that is the extreme version. It can be achieved through:
Global EMP: High-altitude nuclear detonations designed to collapse the global electrical grid. Since the grid is interconnected and global supply chains rely on it, an EMP attack on the US, Europe, and Russia effectively destroys the economy of China and other neutrals by severing their markets and financial systems.
Financial Decapitation: Cyber-attacks or physical strikes on the hubs of the global financial system (SWIFT, data centers) to "clear" the "clogged system" of global trade, ensuring that no power retains economic leverage.3
Resource Denial: Radiological contamination of key resource areas (e.g., oil fields, straits) to prevent their use by survivors.
3.4 The "Broken-Backed" War and Persistence of Conflict
The "broken-backed war" theory—a conflict continuing after the initial nuclear exchange—provides the operational context for system-clearing. In the chaotic aftermath, surviving military units (naval carrier groups, missile submarines) become autonomous warlords. Without central command, their "terminal rationality" might lead them to strike at any surviving power center they perceive as a threat or a target for plunder.
The rejection of the broken-backed war theory in the 1950s was based on the assumption of total annihilation. However, with modern, lower-yield weapons and missile defenses, it is possible that states survive in a degraded form. In this scenario, the "fight until the end" mentality ensures that the conflict expands until all capability is exhausted.
4. The Technological Accelerant: AI, Automation, and Flash Wars
The psychological and geopolitical incentives for cascade are exacerbated by the physical architecture of modern nuclear command and control. The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the automation of retaliation create a "technological imperative" for escalation that human decision-makers may be unable to override.
4.1 The "Dead Hand": Automating Spite
The "Dead Hand" (or Perimeter) system is the embodiment of the "doomed state" logic. Developed by the Soviet Union and modernized by Russia, it is a semi-automatic system designed to launch a mass nuclear strike if it detects a nuclear attack and loses contact with the leadership.
This system solves the "decapitation" problem—the fear that a first strike could kill the leadership before they order retaliation. However, it creates a "fail-deadly" risk. If the system relies on sensors (seismic, radiation, pressure) and AI-driven logic to determine if the country has been destroyed, it is vulnerable to spoofing, errors, or "catalytic" triggers.
Mechanism: A third party (or a terrorist group) could theoretically detonate a device or simulate sensor data to trick the Perimeter system into believing a US strike has occurred.
Implication: The system would launch a "system-clearing" salvo against pre-programmed targets (US and potentially Europe/China) without human intervention. This essentially automates the "spite" response, ensuring that the "doomed state" lashes out even if its leaders would have chosen restraint.
4.2 Artificial Intelligence and "Flash Wars"
The integration of AI into decision-support systems introduces the risk of "flash wars"—conflicts that escalate faster than human cognition. Just as algorithmic trading causes "flash crashes" in stock markets, AI-driven C3I systems can interact in unpredictable ways.
James Johnson's research highlights that AI compresses "decision time". In a crisis involving hypersonic missiles (which reduce warning time to minutes), AI systems advise commanders on courses of action. If the AI is programmed with "instrumental rationality" to maximize military advantage, it may recommend a preemptive strike or a "Launch on Warning" (LOW) to avoid losing the arsenal.
Scenario: An AI system detects an ambiguity—a large conventional missile salvo or a cyber-attack on early warning radars. It interprets this as a precursor to a nuclear strike. To save the deterrent forces, it recommends an immediate launch.
The Trap: Because the decision window is compressed, human operators become rubber stamps for the machine's logic. The "human in the loop" becomes a "human on the loop," merely observing the cascade.
Table 2: The Impact of Emerging Technologies on Escalation Dynamics
4.3 Catalytic Nuclear War in the AI Age
The concept of "catalytic nuclear war"—where a third party instigates a war between two major powers—is revolutionized by AI. In the past, this required a physical false-flag attack. Today, it can be achieved through "information complexity, misinformation, and manipulation".
Deep Fakes: An AI could generate a realistic video of a US President ordering a strike, or a Russian General authorizing a launch. In the chaos of a crisis, this could trigger a "believed" first strike.
Cyber Spoofing: A third party (or an autonomous AI agent) could insert false targets into the radar systems of a nuclear power. The "Dead Hand" or the "Launch on Warning" protocols would react to this phantom data as if it were real.
The research indicates that AI creates a "perfect storm of instability," where the rationality of deterrence is replaced by the algorithmic rigidity of machines that do not fear death, but fear only the failure to execute their code.46
5. Mechanisms of Civilizational Collapse: The Physical Cascade
5.1 Stratospheric Soot Injection: The Sunlight Shock
5.2 Agricultural Output Collapse: Calories, Not Crops
5.3 Trade Collapse: The Network Failure That Kills Billions
5.4 Human Survival Arithmetic: The Uncomfortable Numbers
5.5 Grid and Systems Failure: Why Money, Power, and Bunkers Stop Mattering
5.6 Ozone Collapse and UV-B: The Recovery Trap
5.7 The No-Safe-Haven Reality: Why Distance and Neutrality Fail
5.8 The Elite-Specific Conclusion: No Control, No Exit, No Reset
6. Synthesis and Strategic Implications: The Inevitable Cascade
The analysis of 'Mutual Assured Destruction in an Age of Uncertainty' reveals a deterministic logic to the collapse. It is not a series of unfortunate events, but a rigid chain of incentives that, once triggered, are nearly impossible to break.
6.1 The Cascade Model
The report synthesizes the findings into a "Cascade Model" of nuclear war:
The Trigger: A bilateral crisis (e.g., Taiwan, Ukraine) escalates due to Entanglement (conventional strikes perceived as nuclear) and Alliance Chain-ganging.
The Acceleration: AI and Automation compress decision times, forcing leaders into "Flash Wars" and "Launch on Warning" postures to avoid losing their arsenals.
The Singularity: As the exchange begins, the leadership perceives the state as "Doomed." Terminal Rationality takes over, prioritizing Spite and the Samson Option over de-escalation.
The Expansion: To prevent the adversary or neutral powers from winning the post-war order, the dying state initiates System-Clearing Escalation, targeting global hubs and neutral powers.
The Collapse: The massive use of weapons triggers Nuclear Winter, EMP Grid Collapse, and Global Famine, resulting in total Civilizational Collapse from which no state recovers.
6.2 Critiquing Nuclear Optimism
This model serves as a definitive refutation of Kenneth Waltz's "Nuclear Optimism." Waltz argued that nuclear weapons induce stability because rational actors fear destruction. However, this optimism fails to account for:
Doomed State Psychology: Rationality changes when the actor is dying.
Multipolar Instability: The complexity of N-body deterrence makes miscalculation likely.
Technological Automation: Machines do not feel fear; they execute code. The "Dead Hand" is the ultimate negation of Waltz's rational actor.
6.3 Conclusion: The Fragility of the Moment
The "Age of Uncertainty" is a period of supreme danger. The barriers that prevented nuclear war in the 20th century—fear, rationality, and bipolar simplicity—have been eroded by spite, terminal rationality, and multipolar complexity. The integration of AI has greased the skids of escalation, while the interconnectedness of the global economy has ensured that the fall of one is the fall of all.
The report concludes that under current strategic postures, a limited nuclear war is an analytic impossibility. The incentives for "system-clearing" are too strong, and the automated mechanisms for escalation are too fast. As the "Doomed State" looks into the abyss, it finds a rational reason to pull the rest of the world in with it. The result is not a victory for anyone, but a "system-clearing" of human civilization itself.
Appendix A: Key Strategic Concepts
Table 4: Glossary of Terms
PART II
From Deterrence Failure to Civilizational Security: Centralized Global Governance and Complete Disarmament
7. The Logical Corollary of the Cascade Model
The preceding analysis demonstrates that nuclear war in the contemporary strategic environment is not merely catastrophic but structurally non-containable. The interaction of multipolar deterrence, terminal rationality, system-clearing incentives, automation, and global interdependence produces a deterministic escalation pathway once a nuclear threshold is crossed.
If this diagnosis is correct, then any solution that preserves independent state control over organized violence fails at the level of first principles.
The core implication is unavoidable:
As long as sovereign entities retain the capacity for large-scale organized violence, particularly extinction-capable violence, the cascade mechanisms identified in Part I remain latent and eventually activatable.
Accordingly, this section examines the only solution that directly removes the causal architecture of civilizational collapse: centralized global governance rooted in Civitology, coupled with complete disarmament.
8. Why Incremental Remedies Are Structurally Insufficient
Before articulating the disarmament framework, it is necessary to clarify why commonly proposed reforms cannot resolve the risks identified.
8.1 Arms Control as a Risk-Management, Not Risk-Elimination Tool
Arms control regimes reduce arsenals, regulate deployments, and build confidence under conditions of strategic stability. However, they implicitly assume:
Continuing state survival
Rational compliance under stress
Functional verification mechanisms during crises
As demonstrated in the analysis of terminal rationality and system-clearing escalation, these assumptions collapse precisely when stakes are highest. Doomed or decapitated states have no incentive to comply with arms control norms, while automated and degraded systems undermine verification when it matters most.
Arms control therefore manages probability, not eliminates possibility. For civilizational risk, this distinction is decisive.
8.2 Deterrence Reform and the Illusion of Safer MAD
Proposals for “stable deterrence,” “no-first-use,” or “minimum credible deterrence” remain embedded in the same structural logic: fear-based restraint under sovereign control of force.
Part I demonstrates that deterrence fails under conditions of:
Compressed decision time
Automation
Multipolar incentive misalignment
Terminal rationality
There is no configuration of deterrence that remains robust once survival itself is no longer the operative objective. Deterrence theory thus cannot be repaired; it must be superseded.
9. The Civitological Security Principle
Civitology approaches security not through balance-of-power frameworks but through systems survivability analysis.
Its foundational security principle is:
No subsystem of civilization may possess irreversible destructive capacity independent of collective governance.
Extinction-capable weapons violate this principle absolutely. Their continued existence anywhere in the system renders the entire system unstable.
This leads to a categorical conclusion:
Civilizational security requires the complete removal of extinction-capable military power from all sovereign entities.
10. Centralized Governance as a Structural Necessity
Centralized global governance in this context does not imply political homogenization, cultural unification, or economic central planning. It refers narrowly to the monopolization and limitation of legitimate force at the civilizational level, analogous to the historical transition from feudal militarization to the modern state.
Just as the consolidation of force within states ended endemic private warfare, a further consolidation is now required to address planetary-scale risk.
11. “One Army” as Complete Disarmament, Not Militarization
A critical clarification follows from this framework.
The concept of “one army for the world” does not denote the consolidation of national militaries into a larger war-fighting institution. Such consolidation would merely globalize the same extinction logic identified in Part I.
Instead, under Civitology, “one army” signifies:
The abolition of armies as instruments of interstate war and the complete disarmament of sovereign states.
Any residual force is strictly limited, non-strategic, and structurally incapable of mass destruction. Its mandate is enforcement of disarmament, protection of global commons, and response to non-state violence or systemic collapse—not war between political units.
12. How Complete Disarmament Neutralizes the Cascade Mechanisms
Each causal mechanism identified in Part I is directly dismantled by complete disarmament.
12.1 Elimination of the Doomed-State Incentive
Without extinction-capable weapons, no state can impose terminal outcomes on others once its own survival is threatened. Terminal rationality loses operational relevance when the means of civilizational destruction are absent.
12.2 Prevention of System-Clearing Escalation
System-clearing escalation is only rational when post-war dominance is possible and when tools exist to reshape the hierarchy violently. Complete disarmament removes both conditions, rendering hierarchy denial strategies inoperative.
12.3 Removal of Automation from Existential Decisions
Absent strategic weapons, AI-driven command-and-control systems cannot trigger irreversible outcomes. Errors, misperceptions, and cyber interference become recoverable rather than fatal.
12.4 Dissolution of Alliance Chain-Ganging
With no national militaries capable of strategic escalation, alliance structures lose their capacity to propagate conflict. Security becomes universal rather than bloc-based.
13. Enforcement Without War
A common objection to complete disarmament concerns enforcement and security vacuums. However, the analysis of contemporary violence suggests that most conflict is internal, asymmetric, or criminal rather than interstate.
A globally accountable enforcement body—lightly armed, transparent, and constrained—can address such threats without recreating the conditions for strategic war. Crucially, it is structurally incapable of system-clearing violence.
14. Transition Architecture
Recognizing political and institutional realities, Civitology proposes a phased but irreversible transition:
Global denuclearization, including dismantlement of warheads and delivery systems
Progressive demilitarization, with conversion of military-industrial capacity
Establishment of a limited global enforcement authority
Constitutional prohibition of rearmament, enforced through global monitoring
Each phase reduces existential risk independently, avoiding an all-or-nothing dependency.
15. Conclusion: From Managed Risk to Removed Risk
Part I established that nuclear war in the contemporary world cannot remain limited, rational, or bilateral. Once initiated, escalation proceeds through predictable and uncontrollable pathways toward civilizational collapse.
Part II demonstrates that partial measures—deterrence reform, arms control, or technological safeguards—cannot interrupt these pathways because they leave the underlying incentive structure intact.
Only complete disarmament under centralized global governance rooted in Civitology removes the causal mechanisms that make extinction a rational outcome of power politics.
This is not a utopian proposition.
It is the minimal structural adaptation required for a civilization that has acquired the means to end itself.
In this sense, disarmament is not the abandonment of security.
It is its only durable form.
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